European governments—and the media that follow their lead—continue to react to Donald Trump’s “National Security Strategy” as if the current president had invented Washington’s hostility toward any genuine European unity, whereas he has merely made it provocatively explicit, in well-tested alignment with Moscow. In doing so, the President of the United States provides Europeans with a valuable opportunity to define and focus the urgent correction of the structure and direction of the European Union, toward its independence —not merely “autonomy”— in strategic terms, restoring to its peoples the only sovereignty possible. A further paradox is that Giorgia Meloni —the supposed sovereigntist and former fascist who, as Prime Minister of the Italian Republic, allows herself to be kissed on the head by Joe Biden, only then to become the factotum (certainly not a courtier) of Donald Trump— reminds our homegrown pseudo-Europeanists that there exists another Europe beyond the current EU: that of Ventotene. It will not happen now, but that must be the perspective.

Let me explain by drawing on a few personal memories. When, after the fall of the Wall, I met Henry Kissinger again—who had been my professor during two years of my youth —I asked him: “Isn’t it true that you have always been hostile to European unification?” He replied: “No, why do you say that?” Then, after a pause for reflection, he added: “I think you are right.” This belated admission refers to a reality dating back to the time of the United States’ defeat in Vietnam, which marked the beginning of the decline of its previously uncontested global hegemony. This led to a growing dependence, for the purpose of consolidating the residual U.S. political-military primacy, on the persistence of the Soviet “credible threat.” It was Kissinger himself, at the height of his power, by then Secretary of State under the unprepared President Gerald Ford, who urged the head of the CIA at the time, George Tenet, to rewrite his assessment of Soviet power, because it was insufficient to justify U.S. military spending and presence worldwide. This coincided with a shift in relations with European allies, who had been encouraged in the 1950s by Eisenhower to unite in order to create their own autonomous defense, with the aim of forming an improbable “alliance among equals” —later supported by the presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson— within NATO.

The fall of the Wall, far from constituting “the end of history” and the triumph of Washington’s foreign policy in a now unipolar world, in fact marked its crisis. Deprived of the “credible threat,” U.S. leaders —whom we might call post-Kissingerian— found themselves engaged in an anxious effort to substitute the Soviet threat, now insufficient to justify armaments and military bases, along with the associated burden on taxpayers. After the end of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, and with it the far-sighted political understanding between James Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev, their successors sought to preserve NATO, objectively obsolete, by extending its borders eastward, further humiliating Russia.

After the anti-Serbian interventions in the Balkans, the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 and the ensuing “war on terror” restored room for Washington’s role as a military power; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the attacks on Libya, served to provide oxygen to the military-industrial complex, half a century after Eisenhower’s warning. Finally, Russia’s long-provoked attack on Ukraine produced the mutually beneficial effect—useful for both declining superpowers—of resurrecting the specters of the Cold War. China, a rising great power, was instead engaged in building a multipolar world, using the BRICS as an instrument; it was therefore scarcely inclined to adopt the bipolar framework of which the United States and Russia remain as tenacious as they are inconsolable widows.

And Europe? An adversary of Washington —and not just today. Here I once again yield to the temptation of a personal recollection. Thursday, September 17, 1992. The Italian Senate was engaged in the debate preceding the vote to authorize the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, scheduled for the afternoon at the conclusion of the week’s work. Italy’s approval would not have made headlines, but even a postponement could have had fatal consequences for the treaty throughout Europe. France had in fact decided to submit it to a referendum, with a highly uncertain outcome, scheduled for the following Sunday. A failure by Italy to ratify it would have revived the specter of the collapse of the European Defence Community, which in 1955 was rejected by the government of Mendès-France, using it as a reason or pretext.

The problem was not the availability of a majority, but the lack of a quorum. Indeed, to the votes of the majority held by the last “pentapartito” government, led by Giuliano Amato, would have been added those of the largest opposition group, linked to the PDS. In the preceding months, we had decided to vote in favor because the treaty provided for the establishment of a common currency, the euro—one of the three essential prerogatives, alongside territory and government, for the creation of a united and sovereign Europe. By contrast, the groups of Alleanza Nazionale and Rifondazione Comunista, while declaring themselves in favor of that objective, believed—with some justification—that other aspects of the treaty would give rise to a “Europe of bankers.” For this reason, they did not merely express opposition but engaged in obstruction that endangered the achievement of a quorum.

By mid-morning, a dramatic turn occurred. The majority rapporteur, Senator Bruno Orsini of the DC, and the Socialist group leader, Gennaro Acquaviva, approached me to ask what the reaction of the PDS would be if the government decided to postpone the vote to an unspecified date, citing the emerging crisis of the previous European Monetary System (EMS) as justification (which, in reality, made the treaty’s approval even more urgent). Strengthened by the united position of my group, I replied loudly that we would take up the flag of Europe and use it to strike the government as long as we saw it move. Half an hour later, my interlocutors returned, announcing an intervention by Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo, who would reaffirm the commitment to hold the vote at the end of the session. At that point, I had to ask for an explanation. The answer was: “Pressure from Washington opposing the euro in order to protect the dollar.” Confirming this, the lax presidency of Giovanni Spadolini—top of the class in the American court of the time—was facilitating the obstruction that could have jeopardized the quorum and, consequently, the fate of the treaty. At that point, armed with this episode, I informed Luigi Vinci—Rifondazione’s representative on the Foreign Affairs committee—who, after a brief pause, confirmed the opposing vote but guaranteed the quorum that saved the treaty, allowing the Senate not to make headlines even at the global level.

If, in all likelihood, the defense of the dollar in global markets and the resulting hostility to the birth of the euro were the trigger of the events recalled here, what were —and remain —the reasons for this U.S. determination against a united and sovereign Europe? The Europe envisioned by the signatories of the Ventotene Manifesto, which inspired the Treaty of Rome and many statesmen, from Jean Monnet to Jacques Delors. As Washington’s hegemony gradually evaporated, the political unity of a market of around 500 million people, with a strong social-democratic imprint —especially in Northern Europe, yet not attributable to anti-democratic orientations or structures —would have created a formidable rival, more threatening than the accommodating enemy in Moscow, and not dismissible as a hostile dictatorship. In prospect, such a Europe could have jeopardized NATO’s future, which has poorly survived the fall of the Wall, putting an end to Washington’s divide et impera in Europe.

Today, the dream of Madeleine Albright and Victoria Nuland (“Fuck Europe!”) —to name just two significant figures — even before that of Donald Trump, has almost come true. The corrupt management of Ursula von der Leyen, aided by the sovereigntist convergences of the Baltic countries and the Visegrád group, has turned the European Union into a compliant instrument of Washington under Moscow’s approving gaze.

War propaganda, fueled by the bloody events in Ukraine and Palestine, has led to a rearmament policy serving the U.S. military-industrial complex, precluding a European defense —with its corresponding economies of scale — which would require an integrated foreign policy. The anachronistic role of Putin’s Russia as a “credible threat” is reinforced by the interruption of gas and oil purchases from Moscow —along with the Western sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying Germany — by sanctions policies, and by the freezing of Russian financial assets in Europe. At the same time, Trump’s United States revives and even theorizes in an official document its traditional policy in Europe, based on interference in both foreign and domestic affairs of individual states. The EU has provided no proportionate response to the increases in export tariffs imposed by Trump, nor to the obligation to raise military spending within NATO agreements, mostly in the form of purchases of U.S. weapons.

In short, we are facing a “vast enterprise,” as Charles de Gaulle would say. And yet a different Europe, inspired by its original vision, could take its place in a more peaceful multipolar world, mark the end of the prolonged Cold War, and even stimulate a shift by the United States and Russia, still engaged in dividing it into spheres of influence. A change of direction that would allow a fair distribution of resources, freedom of exchange as a condition for peaceful and productive coexistence, and the ecological preservation of the planet. In short: bread, peace, and freedom for all. Utopia? As Barbara Ward, alongside Kwame Nkrumah—then president of Ghana—stated more than half a century ago, we are in urgent need of “relevant utopias” which, even if they are not realized, point immediately to the direction in which we must commit ourselves.

Gian Giacomo Migone