What is your assessment following the latest informal European Council, Orbán’s defeat and the change of government in Bulgaria? Have the political balances shifted?
They have changed, but only to some extent. We need to see what political priorities Magyar, the new Hungarian Prime Minister, will pursue. In any case, I would like to point out that, until two years ago, he was a member of the same party as Orbán. Some deadlocks have been broken, such as the €90 billion loan to Ukraine, as Orbán’s veto has been lifted. However, there are other issues where we need to understand what the new government’s stance will be. Incidentally, Orbán did not attend the last European Council, whilst Magyarhad had not yet been officially appointed: so Hungary was not represented, whereas for Bulgaria, the outgoing government was still in place, pending the formation of the new government.
There are other unclear issues, such as the debate on Ukraine’s accession, which is being strongly pushed by both Costa and von der Leyen. According to the current budget, we would have to spend 85billion a year to fund Ukraine’s agricultural policy. The conditions for a fast accession are not in place. My belief is that, despite holding a different position to Orbán’s, Magyar will also put the brakes on the issue of enlargement.
What issues were addressed at the last European Council?
At this European Council, three hours of debate were supposed to be devoted to the multiannual financial framework. Those three hours were gradually cut short because they had other matters to discuss. We have not yet moved beyond the era of vetoes, because the multiannual framework only enters into force if the European Parliament gives its consent. Moreover, there is a legal issue. The European Council has assumed the right to decide on the multiannual financial framework, but the Treaty stipulates that it is not the European Council, but the Council of the EU, that is responsible. Furthermore, Parliament’s vote is decisive: in the resolution adopted by the Committee on Budgets, it was stated that the multiannual financial framework would be approved subject to certain conditions. And these conditions, for the time being, do not exist. Governments and the Commission are deluding themselves that an agreement will be reached by the end of the year. They lack a proper historical perspective. Except in 2005, under Tony Blair’s presidency, when it was approved a year in advance, in all other cases (in 1992, in 1999, etc.), the multiannual financial framework has always been approved just a few weeks before the deadline. So the European Council’s idea that there will be an agreement between Parliament and the Council before the end of 2026 is completely unfounded.
Which years should the new financial framework cover?
For now, it is expected to run from 2028 to2034, but a financial framework that effectively bypasses the upcoming European elections and shapes the entire next parliamentary term makes no sense. It means that the next European Parliament will be shaped by a financial framework decided by this Parliament and this Commission. Furthermore, between now and 2034 there will be a few accessions – not many – perhaps Montenegro and Albania. For Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia, there will be many difficulties, not to mention the countries of Eastern Europe, namely Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (incidentally, the Georgian government has put its accession application on hold). But perhaps we will have two or three more countries in the EU. Montenegro is in pole position; the accession treaty is already ready. Then there is Albania, and then we will see how the referendum in Iceland goes in August this year. However, there are many other things to factor into the budget. And that is why Parliament has included a paragraph requiring the next Commission to present, by July 2031, a new financial framework. This means it would no longer be a seven-year framework, but a five-year one. If, on the other hand, Parliament does not vote on the financial framework by the end of 2027, from 1 January 2028 we would enter the ‘twelfths system’.
Incidentally, it is worth noting that on 1 January 2028, Italy will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU. The new government, which ever it may be, will be left with the hot potato of reopening negotiations with Parliament.
Is there a risk of further vetoes?
There is the issue of ‘own resources’ to finance the European budget. The Commission has put forward a package of five own resources, and many governments are opposed to it. Another issue is that the European Commission has sought, in a sense, to nationalise the budget, which will be based on 27 national plans, primarily concerning agricultural policy and cohesion (which account for 40% of the total). The Commission’s proposal suggests a single fund combining agricultural policy, fisheries and social and territorial cohesion. Some countries, such as Italy (but not only), do not agree with the idea of merging cohesion policy with agricultural policy and believe the two funds should remain separate. There is no agreement among governments on this point.
Furthermore, the European Commission proposes that the repayment of NextGenerationEU be included in the next budget, which would mean reducing the overall budget. If this were to go through, Italy would receive 12% less from the budget, as it has a significant amount to repay. In the Committee on Budgets, Parliament has called for an increase in the European budget from 1.26% to 1.38% of the EU’s GDP, removing the repayment of NextGenerationEU from the financial framework.
What are your thoughts on the situation in Bulgaria, which is rarely discussed?
The transition to the euro has gone fairly well. The new head of government, Radev, is a nationalist – let’s call him a social democrat. In the Italian press, he has been described as ‘the new Orbán’. That is not true. Certainly, Radev is someone who defends Bulgaria’s national interests, but he cannot be described as a right-wing politician. He should rather be placed within the centre-left spectrum, a nationalist centre-left. Certainly, Radev is very cautious about enlargement towards the countries of Eastern Europe.
A change of government is also highly likely in Romania, as indeed in Slovenia, where an eurosceptic Prime Minister could come to power. In short, does Orbán’s departure not clarify matters within the European Council; will there always be problematic positions?
What does the MFE plan to do in the finalstretch of the parliamentary term?
Over the next two years, we cannot revive the prospect of constitutional reform. Parliament itself has forgotten the institutional consequences of the Draghi report. There is no desire on its part to revive a reform of the Treaties, let alone of the Commission or the governments. In this parliamentary term, we will have to proceed with the existing Treaties, using, for example, the passerelle clause, even if this is not very easy. Some believe that the solution will come from enhanced cooperation. We must not overlook the fact that, from 1999 to the present day, we have implemented only four instances of enhanced cooperation: two on the family, one on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the other on patents. There have been no others.
As for the 2029 elections, could this be the platform to relaunch a constituent perspective?
On 9 September, we will launch a campaign called ‘Obiettivo 1000’ (Target 1000) because there will be exactly one thousand days to go until the 2029 European elections. As it is not certain that the next Parliament will be a constituent assembly, a political campaign is needed to make this happen. Some parties must commit to including this idea in their manifestos, but for this t ohappen, we must work to ensure it does. We need to understand which European political parties are willing to commit to this path. It is still 2026, so there are still three years to go until this deadline.
In 2024, 50% of European citizens did not turn out to vote. So the campaign must target those who abstained, that is, those who did not consider it important, useful or necessary to go and vote. Furthermore, in 2029, 10 million new voters will be voting for the first time. So we must run a campaign for young people, bearing in mind that in 2024, they were the ones who voted the least.
Will there be a change at the top in Brussels?
I would like to mention one final point: the Treaty would allow, when the next term comes to an end, for the posts of President of the Commission and President of the European Council to be merged. The problem is that there are at least three major parties, and each one wants a post: the more posts there are (President of the European Parliament, Presidentof the European Council, and President of the Commission), the easier it is to distribute them. Incidentally, there are rumours that Ursula von der Leyen could become Federal President of Germany when Steinmeier’s term expires in2027. If Ursula von der Leyen were to move to Berlin, a new President of the Commission would have to be found. And so there are two possibilities. Either the EPP puts forward one of their own (the former Greek or Irish Prime Ministers). And the question arises as to whether only the President should change, or the entire College of Commissioners (as happened following Santer’s resignation in 1999). And some are beginning to suggest, given that the term of the President of the European Council, António Costa, is also coming to an end (it is a renewable two-and-a-half-year term ), why not revive the proposal for a single President? And this would be the second option. And in the corridors of power in Europe, the only name being bandied about, without ever beingmentioned outright, is that of Mario Draghi. Should a serious crisis arise, Draghi would be called upon, as has already happened in Italy.
However, there is not much enthusiasm for this option. At the last European Council, the Draghi report was shelved, and only the Letta report was discussed. The latter could be implemented on a level budget, whereas the Draghi report would be very costly. This is why priority was given to the former, and this is not a good sign for Draghi becoming the single president of the Commission and the European Council, not least because the parties would lose a post to allocate.
