Giorgio Malfatti di Montetretto

Despite the arbitrary definition of territorial borders drawn on a purely administrative basis during the Soviet era, there are no state claims capable of undermining regional stability, apart from the persistent dispute concerning the Fergana Valley. This area is politically divided between eastern Uzbekistan, western Kyrgyzstan, and northern Tajikistan, and represents a node of primary importance for the three countries involved. Roughly the size of the Po Valley, the Fergana Valley is rich in agricultural and water resources and is historically located along the main overland routes connecting China with the Caucasus, the Iranian plateau, and the Eurasian steppes. It was, not surprisingly, a key sector of the ancient Silk Road and a strategic center for all the empires that have succeeded one another in the region.

At the beginning of 2022, after thirty years of limited border skirmishes, an armed conflict broke out between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the part of the disputed territory near an infrastructure for water distribution. It was the first interstate conflict in the area since the dissolution of the USSR. At the heart of the dispute lies control over water, an increasingly scarce and strategic resource (Tajikistan possesses significant reserves), whose availability could be compromised by the melting of glaciers.

The conflict involved two countries which, paradoxically, are and remain both members of the same military alliance (the Collective Security Treaty Organization – CSTO) and the same international organization (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – SCO). Thanks to mediation by Uzbekistan and the SCO, later approved by a Russian Federation distracted by the war in Ukraine, the conflict subsided, returning to the situation prior to the clashes. In February 2025, the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan then signed a treaty to delimit the thousand-kilometer border between the two countries, but full water peace in the region still seems distant. In any case, despite tensions and latent claims, large-scale operations have ceased and retreated within the borders of the respective states.

The international community has remained little involved in the issue, being preoccupied with other conflicts, but recently several intelligence agencies have been monitoring the risk of infiltration by Islamic terrorism in this small territory. This is especially true in areas administered by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, although the security threat in Uzbek territory should not be underestimated, where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was highly active in the past. It should not be forgotten that one of the most ruthless Chechen jihadist leaders first fought in the Tajik civil war and later in the Fergana Valley. Both the government of Dushanbe and that of Bishkek have confirmed that in recent years there has been an increase in incidents related to terrorism and radicalization, and that the jihadist threat is becoming increasingly tangible in Central Asia. This is largely due to the emergence of ISIS-K, or the Islamic State of Khorasan, the Afghan branch of ISIS, which appeared in 2014 in eastern Afghanistan and quickly became notorious for the brutality of its attacks, including the April 2024 attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall. ISIS-K recruits militants—estimated at at least two thousand fighters—with an operational reach stretching from Afghanistan to Moscow, passing through Iran and the Caucasus. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most important and stable countries in the region, may become targets of jihadist terrorism and are not immune to possible Russian interference, which could use counterterrorism as a pretext for intervention within their borders. It should be noted that, in ISIS-K’s claim of responsibility, the Crocus City Hall attack was a bloody response to a Russian operation that dismantled one of its Kazakh cells.

Finally, within the complex network of rivalries over water management, the construction in Tajikistan of the Rogun Dam could have an impact. At over three thousand meters, it will be the highest dam in the world. It is a grand and unfinished Soviet-era project intended to ensure the country’s energy independence, now resumed with funding from the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, as well as domestic bonds. The dam is being built on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, on which the irrigation systems of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan depend. In particular, Uzbek agriculture is almost entirely reliant on the waters of the Amu Darya. Tashkent has always opposed the project, even threatening military intervention should it be completed. The importance of the Amu Darya for Uzbekistan is comparable to that of the Nile for Egypt. (2 – to be continued)