Philippe Ward
The diagnosis has been clear for nearly two years. Yet, by the summer of 2026, the conclusion has become increasingly stark: the flagship recommendations of Mario Draghi’s report on the European Union’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy have been implemented only in part. While the analysis was lucid and the structural proposals compelling, political and administrative execution has proved to be the initiative’s greatest blind spot. Europe knows what it must do; it simply does not know how to do it within a fragmented institutional framework.
This delay is no longer merely a question of lost macroeconomic opportunity. By 2026, the architecture of global security has fundamentally changed. Europe now faces the existential challenge of preserving its economic and industrial viability in a world increasingly defined by systemic confrontation and a state of undeclared economic and strategic warfare. In the face of this urgency, the EU’s political fragmentation has become a powerful source of paralysis. National leaders remain structurally inclined toward tactical retrenchment, favouring domestic stimulus packages and uncoordinated national subsidies over the critical mass that only collective action can provide.
Beyond the European Union Framework: An Alliance of Resilient Democracies
Europe must change both its method and its scale. A purely intra-EU approach has reached its institutional and geographical limits. The time has come to entrust operational leadership to an internationally respected figure with a mandate to launch a genuine programme for strategic autonomy.
To succeed, this initiative must extend beyond the formal boundaries of the European Union while fully preserving Brussels’ central coordinating role. It should build upon the doctrine articulated by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum in Davos: the systematic mobilisation of democratic nations—European and non-European alike—capable of making meaningful technological, financial, or industrial contributions. The objective is no longer legal integration but the effectiveness and resilience of strategic value chains.
The operational architecture of such a programme would be organised around integrated industrial value chains. Each participating country would assume leadership of a highly strategic sector based on its comparative advantages, technological expertise, and industrial capabilities. Ukraine, drawing on unparalleled operational experience, would naturally lead the drone and low-intensity warfare ecosystem. Canada would coordinate the secure development and supply of critical minerals and rare earths. Norway would oversee the resilience of natural gas supply chains, while Switzerland would contribute its internationally recognised excellence in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. The deliberate inclusion of non-EU partners and sectors with both civilian and defence applications reflects the universal ambition and operational flexibility of the concept.
Rediscovering the Monnet Method: Planning Through Markets
This modern system of governance is not intended to impose state planning or to abandon the proven benefits of open markets—an approach that would inevitably breed inefficiency and technological stagnation. On the contrary, its central purpose is to maximise the mobilisation of private capital while preserving healthy competition. The designated lead country would not become a monopolistic producer but rather the coordinator of its industrial ecosystem.
In practical terms, the proposal draws directly on the balance of needs and resources mechanism originally developed by Jean Monnet in 1916 to coordinate the Allied logistical effort during the First World War. Under a modernised version of this framework, participating governments would submit forward-looking assessments of their medium-term industrial and technological requirements to the sector coordinator. The coordinator would then aggregate demand and place large-scale industrial orders on behalf of the participating coalition. In this process, the European Commission’s Directorates-General have a historic role to play by providing their well-established procedural expertise to maximise cross-border procurement, eliminate duplication, and generate economies of scale.
Such an effort requires financial resources commensurate with the hundreds of billions of dollars committed over a decade through the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act beginning in 2022. The necessary legal instrument already exists: the logic of the 2021 Recovery and Resilience Facility should simply be replicated. Furthermore, the joint proposal advanced by Prime Minister Carney and Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Luc Frieden to establish a multilateral bank dedicated to defence, security, and resilience points in the right direction. Investments across these industrial ecosystems would therefore be jointly financed and guaranteed by the European Union and its international partners, providing the long-term certainty that private investors require.
Economic Incentives as a Safeguard Against Political Fragmentation
An industrial ecosystem approach also addresses the political dilemma confronting Western democracies. By locating high-value industrial activities across the territories of participating countries, national governments would be able to demonstrate immediate, measurable benefits to their electorates in the form of reindustrialisation, skilled employment, and technological investment. Collective action would cease to be perceived as a surrender of sovereignty and instead become the means through which nations regain control over their economic destiny in an era of globalisation.
This model would also provide a measure of resilience against Europe’s political volatility. Even if Eurosceptic or extremist parties were to enter government in some member states, the combination of guaranteed investment, integration into strategic international supply chains, and sustained local job creation would create powerful incentives to remain engaged. Pragmatic integration would continue to advance where ideology might otherwise divide.
The 2029 Imperative: A European Victory Program
The programme would be directed by a senior international coordinator supported by a small team of leading economists and technical experts. Operating along the lines of the Spaak Committee of 1955–1956, this task force would be responsible for producing a concise roadmap and identifying an initial set of high-impact industrial ecosystems capable of generating rapid strategic effects.
History offers a striking precedent. During the First World War, the Allied agreement on wheat procurement ultimately led to the unprecedented pooling of merchant fleets and maritime convoys. Wheat became the catalyst for a far broader system of logistical integration. The strategic industrial ecosystems of 2026 must serve precisely the same catalytic function.
The institutional flexibility of this model is essential to its speed of execution. The strategic objective is straightforward: the first industrial ecosystems should deliver tangible results and secure Europe’s most critical supply chains by 2029. This ambitious timetable deliberately rejects the complacency of distant horizons and instead embraces the sense of urgency that inspired America’s Victory Program of 1941. As history returns with renewed force, Europe can no longer afford to produce reports alone. It must fully enter the age of industrial geopolitics and strategic action.
