Alessandro Giacone Tajikistan is often referred to as the “other roof of the world” (after Nepal), because 90% of its territory is covered by mountains. Its highest peak is Ismail Samani Peak (7,495 m), formerly known as Communism Peak. Unlike its neighbors, the country is rich in water resources thanks to the presence of around one thousand rivers. The Rogun Hydropower Plant, currently under construction in the Pamir region, will, at 335 meters, become the tallest dam in the world. Italian companies are involved in the project. The initiative is strongly opposed by Uzbekistan, which fears a reduction in water flows reaching its territory. ...

Giorgio Malfatti The broader context described above sometimes makes us forget that the Caspian Sea is by no means in good health. Several studies have shown that its water level could drop rapidly due to global warming: a decline of between nine and eighteen meters is expected by the end of this century. Temperatures are rising, water is evaporating, and precipitation is decreasing. A perfect mix for an uncertain future. ...

Giorgio Malfatti di Montetretto The Caspian represents the only major maritime basin in Central Asia. A body of salt water, with no outlet to the open sea, in which the interests of the coastal countries have shaped negotiations over its legal regime. The question of the Caspian Sea gained importance following the dissolution of the USSR, an event that increased the number of littoral states from two (Iran and the Soviet Union) to five (Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), and subsequently led to the discovery of major new hydrocarbon deposits. The region stretching from the Caucasus to Central Asia is one of the oldest oil-producing areas in the world, and had remained largely unexplored until the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had prioritized exploration in Siberia. From that moment on, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were seen by multinational oil companies as alternative suppliers to Russia and therefore as territories worthy of significant investment. ...

Giorgio Malfatti di Montetretto The Entry of Azerbaijan into Central Asia In this context, a significant development has recently taken place with the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the consultative group of Central Asian countries, transforming the C5 into the C6. The group has so far focused on issues such as trade, foreign policy, and dispute resolution. The new configuration, now involving both shores of the Caspian Sea, also represents a response to the repercussions of the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia, which have made it necessary to seek alternative logistical solutions. Thanks to ethnic-religious affinities and a shared Soviet legacy, Azerbaijan integrates smoothly into the Central Asian environment, where Tajikistan represents the only exception due to its Persian origins. The country actively participates in European neighbourhood and Eastern Partnership programmes and plays an essential role in energy corridors toward Europe. Baku also maintains privileged relations with Turkey and adopts a balancing position between Russia, the United States, the European Union, and China. The resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the agreement on the Zangezur Corridor—strongly supported by Donald Trump—which will connect Azerbaijan to Turkey via Armenia, have further strengthened the country’s international prestige, consolidating its role as a key regional actor. ...

Giorgio Malfatti di Montetretto The war in Ukraine has highlighted the weaknesses of the former Soviet “-stan” countries of Central Asia, which, although already well known, have been exacerbated by the current international environment. The most significant challenge, and perhaps the most important one, is the lack of access to the open sea. All of these countries belong to the category of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), meaning that they have no direct access to maritime routes and are therefore disadvantaged in international trade. Economists estimate that countries in this situation lose around 20% of their development potential. ...

Giorgio Malfatti di Montetretto Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the heart of Central Asia underwent a profound geopolitical transformation with the emergence of five new republics in 1991, while three others appeared in the neighboring Caucasus region. This process brought to an end more than two centuries of Russian and Soviet domination over the area. Although independence was proclaimed at roughly the same time, the formal declarations were issued on different dates for purely administrative reasons: Kyrgyzstan on 31 August, Uzbekistan on 1 September, Tajikistan on 9 September, Turkmenistan on 27 October, and finally Kazakhstan on 27 December. ...

Giorgio Malfatti di Montetretto Despite the arbitrary definition of territorial borders drawn on a purely administrative basis during the Soviet era, there are no state claims capable of undermining regional stability, apart from the persistent dispute concerning the Fergana Valley. This area is politically divided between eastern Uzbekistan, western Kyrgyzstan, and northern Tajikistan, and represents a node of primary importance for the three countries involved. Roughly the size of the Po Valley, the Fergana Valley is rich in agricultural and water resources and is historically located along the main overland routes connecting China with the Caucasus, the Iranian plateau, and the Eurasian steppes. It was, not surprisingly, a key sector of the ancient Silk Road and a strategic center for all the empires that have succeeded one another in the region. ...

The Urumqi talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, hosted by China in April following months of tensions and clashes along the border between the two countries, produced neither formal agreements nor statements of particular significance. This apparent stalemate may offer a partially positive interpretation. In a context marked by cross-border raids and mutual accusations of supporting terrorism culminating, on the evening of 16 March 2026, in a bombing of Kabul that struck a hospital and caused, according to Afghan authorities, around 400 deaths and over 250 injuries. [JM1.1]The silence at the conclusion of the talks signals an intent to avoid a diplomatic rupture, keep communication channels open and postpone a political resolution to a later stage. China, for its part, has confirmed an approach based on discreet mediation, attentive to the security of Xinjiang and the stability of regional corridors, but cautious about forcing solutions imposed from above, likely to avoid putting either side’s back against the wall. In short, in their interim outcome, the Urumqi negotiations effectively capture the current situation: a precarious balance, devoid of structural solutions, which risks reigniting dynamics of instability, at least at the regional level. In the shadow of the war in the Middle East, almost five years after the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan remains one of the unresolved issues of the international order. The Western withdrawal has paved the way neither for a process of stabilisation nor for the country’s gradual reintegration, but has instead left behind a sort of quiet chaos: a context rife with latent tensions, strategic ambiguities and structural fragility. It is against this backdrop that the regime has stepped up its efforts in the realm of regional diplomacy, in an attempt to mitigate risks and break, at least partially, the de facto isolation in which it finds itself. The agreement reached with Kazakhstan to increase bilateral trade to three billion dollars a year (from the current 500 million) is an attempt to integrate Afghanistan into a network of economic interdependencies that would make its complete isolation more costly. The Towrgondi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak railway project, the backbone of the so-called CASA (Central Asia–South Asia) corridor, also fits into this framework: for Kabul, this means positioning itself as a transit hub and not merely as a security concern. A similar dynamic is evident in relations with Uzbekistan: intensified trade ties, expanded customs facilitation and investment in key logistics hubs such as the Hairatan rail port, with the aim of increasing the volume of trade to five billion dollars. It is worth noting that these agreements were concluded without Tashkent formally recognising the Afghan government, confirming a pragmatic regionalism driven more by security and stability needs than by political legitimacy. This regional pragmatism, however, finds no echo at the global level. The major multilateral platforms – the UN, the G20, international financial institutions – and Western governments continue to maintain a stance of open mistrust towards the Taliban regime, which is not merely ideological but rests on structural factors: a lack of political inclusivity, systematic human rights violations and repression of independent media. In 2021, following the chaotic withdrawal of foreign forces and the collapse of the government they had supported, some analysts had speculated about a possible ‘Taliban 2.0’: less extremist, more focused on governance and regional non-interference. This expectation quickly proved illusory: whilst today’s Afghanistan seems a far cry from the al-Qaeda sanctuary it was in the 1990s, the optimism of those analysts has in every other respect proved to be premature and naive. The systematic exclusion of women from secondary and university education, from public sector employment and from large swathes of economic and cultural life is not only a despicable form of discrimination, but a factor in structural self-marginalisation. It signals the regime’s refusal to meet the minimum conditions set by the international community. Completing the picture is the problem of corruption, which undermines one of the rhetorical pillars of the Taliban movement. Over the past two years, a series of allegations and resignations has involved ministers and senior officials, particularly in the justice and health sectors. Within a totalitarian regime that imposes police-state control over information, the fact that these allegations have received media coverage and, in some cases, have erupted into full-blown scandals points to the existence of internal rifts, power rivalries and patronage practices that reinforce the mistrust of external actors. Today’s Afghanistan is walking a fine line. Kabul’s regional diplomacy appears more as a survival mechanism than as a project for reintegration into the international order. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the latter is an objective: the leadership seems impervious to external pressure and indifferent to the political, human and economic cost of this isolation. Afghanistan remains a potential source of instability, contained but not resolved. ...